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Many important economic, legal, political, and military decisions are made by groups. Can 
groups make better decisions than individuals in isolation? Since the last decade, researchers 
have documented significant differences between individual and group decision-making in a 
large set of games in the experimental economics literature.
1
 For instance, Cooper and Kagel 
(2005) report that small groups in strategic tasks deliver outcomes beyond the most optimistic 
expectations i.e., better than those from the most skilled individual in the group. In contrast, 
other studies report no difference or even worse performance of groups relative to individuals 
(Davis, 1992; Kerr et al., 1996; Sutter et al., 2009). Yet until recently, economists paid little 
attention to when instead of whether groups perform differently than individuals. 
The aim of this paper is to study under what conditions groups are superior and under 
what conditions are inferior to individuals in overcoming a well-known winner’s curse problem.
2
 
We will shed light on the possible explanations of the differences between individual and group 
decisions and deliver implications about when to employ groups rather than individuals in 
decision making. 
To fulfill this aim, we compare individual and group performances in an Acquiring a 
Company experiment. The standard acquiring a company experiment is based on a bilateral 
bargaining game between a buyer and a seller who move sequentially (Samuelson, 1984; 
Samuelson and Bazerman, 1985). The buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a seller who can 
either accept or reject. The interaction is non-trivial because the seller has more accurate 
information than the buyer about the value of the company. Although it has an objective 
solution, in experiments individuals hardly place optimal bids and many individuals actually 
acquire the company but incur losses; moreover they fail to correct their choices over time. 
To reduce the complexity of the strategic interactions between sellers and buyers and the 
possible misunderstanding of the game, in our experiment, sellers were simulated by a computer 
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 For an excellent literature review comparing group and individual decision making, see Charness and Sutter 
(2012). 
2
 The term ―Winner’s curse‖ refers to the irrational bidding behavior in common value auctions, consistently 
observed in the lab, where bidders often systemically overbid, resulting in an expected loss. Field evidence about 
overbidding has also been accumulated for a variety of similar economic situations, from mineral right auctions, 





that accepted bids only when the bid was greater than or equal to the company’s value.
3
 Having 
all subjects playing in the role of the buyer also eliminates any potential confounding effect due 
to other-regarding preferences. In this way, the strategic bargaining game is converted to a non-
strategic decision task while keeping the adverse selection problem unaffected. Relative to other 
games where optimal strategy depends on beliefs about players’ rationality and strategic 
uncertainty, the behavioral data in this task may provide a sharper view of the decision making 
processes, especially when studying groups.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first experiment investigating individual vs. 
group decision-making in an Acquiring a Company task. To provide implications on when 
groups outperform individuals, we vary the level of difficulty of the task: in the easy version, the 
majority of the individuals can solve the problem; while in the difficult version, only a minority 
can get the correct solution. Will groups place more optimal bids – or at least reduce the number 
of bids placed that loses money in expectation than individuals deciding in isolation in the easy 
task? If so, what is the mechanism that leads groups to perform better than individuals? Will 
groups still outperform individuals when the task is more difficult?  
To investigate the forces that drive the different performance of groups and individuals, 
we break down the group decision making process into three steps: individual proposal step, a 
group chat step, and a decision making step. Using the bid proposals one can identify the precise 
aggregation rule that is used to reach consensus within each group: the group choice could 
follow the best proposal, the median proposal, the proposal of the majority, the worst proposal, a 
rotation scheme, or something else. We also control for possible shifts in risk preferences when 
moving from individuals to group decision making, which could partially account for individual 
vs. group differences.  
Our analyses of groups of three members facing an Acquiring a Company task generate 
several important results. We report that in the easy task, groups substantially reduced the 
winner's curse and generally placed better bids than individuals deciding in isolation. Groups did 
however underperform with respect to a ―truth wins‖ benchmark, although they outperformed 
individuals deciding in isolation. This result was attributed mainly to the aggregation rule of 
individual proposals within the group. When there was disagreement within a group – what 
                                                 
3
 All studies reviewed from the literature used robot sellers, and so do we, with the exception of Carroll et al. (1990, 




prevailed was not the best proposal, i.e. the so called ―truth wins norm,‖ but the median proposal, 
which is more typical for tasks without an objective solution. This median-aggregation rule can 
also explain the observed inferior performance of groups relative to those of individuals when 
they face the difficult task. When the task is sufficiently simple for most people, groups can 
provide better solutions than individuals acting in isolation because those with the wrong answer 
are almost always a minority. When the task is difficult, we shall be more cautious to use groups 
as the decision making unit. Thus the present paper identifies some conditions under which the 
same basic processes of group decision making can lead to good performance in certain contexts 
and poor outcomes in other contexts.
4
  
The paper opens with a literature review in section 2, and presents the experimental 
design in section 3. The results are split into the main ones in sections 4 and the others in section 
5. The paper closes with discussion and conclusions in section 6. 
 
2. Literature Review  
We reviewed nine available experimental studies that have utilized the Acquiring a Company 
task in the economics and management literature.
5
 In none of them, do naïve behavior and the 
winner’s curse disappear with a reasonable amount of experience and feedback. Indeed, 
individuals in these studies failed to avoid naïve bidding and the winner's curse even when they 
were paid for good performance, when their intellective reputations were at stake, when they 
were given hints, and when participants were unusually analytical. In all of these studies, 
decision makers were individuals, with the exception of Cooper and Sutter (2011) where, teams 
of two players,one as a buyer and the other as a seller played a series of the acquiring a company 
game against sellers and buyers from different teams and shared earnings equally. Their goal is 
to examine the impact on performance of endogenous versus random role assignment within 
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 This complements to previous social psychology literature arguing that different performance outcomes are a 
function of inherently different processes (Brodbeck et al. 2007; De Dreu et al. 2008). Brodbeck et al. (2007) 
propose a theoretical model that explains how the interaction between asymmetries in information distribution prior 
to group decision making and asymmetries in information processing during group decision making affects group 
performance. De Dreu et al. (2008) theorize that group performance is a function of social motivation, epistemic 
motivation and their interaction. When decision urgency is low, group outcome benefits from prosocial motivation 
coupled with high levels of epistemic motivation. When groups face emergency situations, groups perform better 
when prosocial motivation is paired with low levels of epistemic motivation. 
5
 Ball, Bazerman, Carroll (1991), Charness and Levin (2009), Cooper and Sutter (2011), Holt and Sherman (1994), 
Selten, Abbink, and Cox (2005), Bereby-Meyer and Grosskopf (2008), Grosskopf, Bereby-Meyer, Bazerman 
(2007), Carroll, Delquie, Halpern, Bazerman (1990), Tor and Bazerman (2003). A design comparison is provided in 




teams whereas in this study all team members were buyers and the main focus is to see when 
group decisions are more rational than individual ones. 
Our Acquiring a Company task is closer to an intellective task than it is to a judgmental 
task. It is also easily demonstrable because it is straightforward to explain to others once a 
subject understands what the optimal bid is.
6
 In comparing individual and group performance on 
an intellective task, Lorge and Solomon (1955) proposed to replace absolute performance of the 
group with the ―truth wins‖ benchmark (i.e., the group should be able to achieve a correct answer 
if at least one member would have chosen it in isolation). Thus, if a fraction p of individuals 
working alone reaches the correct solution, the probability that in a randomly selected group of n 
persons at least one knows it is 1 – (1-p)
 n
. The truth wins benchmark sets a higher standard for 
the group superiority than absolute performance.  
Research on group performance in the psychology literature documents that freely 
interacting groups very rarely exceed and usually fall below the truth wins standard (Davis, 
1992, Kerr et al., 1996), however, more recent research conducted by Laughlin and colleagues 
suggest that in terms of intellective tasks, the absolute performance of groups is superior to the 
performance of individuals (Laughlin, et al., 2002; Laughlin, et al., 2003; Laughlin, et al., 2006). 
Specifically, in a series of experiments conducted by Laughlin and colleagues, three, four, and 
five-person problem-solving groups performed better than the best of an equivalent number of 
individuals on a difficult intellective task (e.g., letters-to-numbers problems). The superior 
performance of groups over individuals was attributed to the demonstrability of the task. 
Laughlin and Ellis (1986) purposed four conditions of demonstrability, which includes group 
consensus on a verbal or mathematical conceptual system, sufficient information for a solution, 
sufficient knowledge of the system to recognize and accept a correct solution if it is proposed, 
and correct members must have sufficient ability, motivation, and time to demonstrate the 
correct solution to the incorrect members. For intellective tasks, groups perform increasingly 
better than individuals as the demonstrability of the tasks increases, such that groups perform at 
the level of the average individual for weakly demonstrable tasks and perform at the level of the 
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 The psychological literature on group versus individual decision-making distinguishes between judgmental and 
intellective tasks (Laughlin, 1980). A judgmental task involves problems where there is no obvious ―correct‖ action 
and individuals may legitimately differ on their choices because of their values or preferences. In contrast, an 
intellective task has a ―correct‖ solution; sometimes this solution is difficult to discover and sometimes it is easy to 




best individual for highly demonstrable tasks (Laughlin and Ellis, 1986). Indeed, groups have 
been shown to perform comparably to the best of an equivalent number of independent 
individuals on intellective tasks when they were given sufficient information and time (Laughlin, 
et al., 1991).  
How groups combine individual preferences is also determined in part by the 
demonstrability of the task. Laughlin (1999) postulates that groups choose to resolve 
disagreement among individual preferences using various social combination models including 
voting (majority or plurality), turn taking (i.e., proportionality), and demonstration (i.e., truth-
wins and truth-supported wins), among others. In a review of the group’s performance and 
decision-making literature, Kerr and Tindale (2004) conclude that groups rarely combine their 
individual preferences in an optimal way; however, groups can maximize their performance 
through the use of simply majority processes. The review also concluded that majority and 
median models, which allow groups to give more weight to those members whose preferences 
are similar, were found to best represent the consensus processes utilized by groups in combining 
member preferences.  
Experimental economics on group performance in intellective tasks focus more on the 
effect of learning and provide mixed results. In a beauty-contest game, Kocher and Sutter (2005) 
found that groups of three subjects did not do more iterations of reasoning than individuals, but 
learned faster than individuals via face to face communication. In signalling games, Cooper and 
Kagel (2005, 2009) reported that teams of two play more strategically than individuals after 
exchanging messages in online chat rooms and a change in the meaningful context of the game 
stalled individual learning process but had no effect on the strategic play of teams. They 
conclude that teams outperformed the truth win benchmark using a simulation of team play 
based on randomly drawing two individuals from the individual treatment. Instead of relying on 
simulated data, our within-subject design allows us to count the instances in which the optimal 
proposal from the individual member prevailed to a final group choice. Also, we examined team 
play in groups of three rather than two, which permits interesting majority or minority behaviour. 
In auctions, two experimental studies employed groups as bidders. Cox and Hayne (2006) 
compare the performance of individuals and groups of five members in a sealed-bid common 
value auction. Groups performed better when the information was common to all group members 




individuals deciding within groups earned more than when deciding in isolation. In the latter 
case, earnings were roughly equivalent. Our design resembles the treatment with common 
information among all group members; hence it relieves groups from the additional burden of 
information sharing. Sutter et al. (2009) compare the performance of individuals and groups of 
three members in an English auction with a private and a common value component. They report 
that groups submitted more winner’s curse bids and therefore earned lower profits than 
individual bidders. They attribute this findings to individual-group differences toward 
competition, i.e., groups competing with other groups are more aggressive than individuals 
competing with other individuals, which is absent in our design as there is just one buyer and the 
seller is a robot. Moreover, bidders can more easily explain to others the rationale for an optimal 
bid in our Acquiring a Company task than in a common value auction. One reason is that the 
optimal strategy does not depend on the bids of others. In Section 7 we will come back to the 
above studies and interpret the results in light of our findings. 
 
3. Experimental Design 
There were two treatments with an ―easy‖ Acquiring a Company task and two treatments with a 
―difficult‖ task. In every session 15 subjects faced several repetitions of the task. Within a 
session there were a Control and Main part. In the six initial repetitions, or periods, of the 
Acquiring a Company task, all subjects decided in isolation (―Control part‖), while in the 
following twenty periods, the decision making processes varied across treatments (―Main part‖). 
In the main part, decision making of subjects continued to be done in isolation in the Individual 
treatment, while subjects had to reach a consensual decision within their group in the Group 
treatment.  
In our experiment, all subjects faced the Acquiring a Company task always as potential 
buyers. The buyer made a take-it-or-leave-it offer b (an integer between 0 and 360) to a seller 
whose company’s value was s. Sellers were simulated through robots who accepted bids only 
when the bid b was greater than or equal to s. The instructions explained how robot sellers made 
their choices. The payoffs for a buyer was 0 if the seller rejected and (1.5s – b) if she accepted. 
The buyer only knew that each realization of s had equal probability. The difficulty of the task 
depends on how many values the company could take. In the literature the range is between two 




have shown that the share of sub-optimal bids is very high, suggesting that a level of difficulty 
beyond the abilities of most participants (e.g., Bereby-Meyer and Grosskopf, 2008). Charness 
and Levin (2009) compared simple designs with a discrete set of possible company values – 
either 2, 4, or 100 values – and reported that subjects had more difficulty handling the 100 value 
than the 2 or 4 value tasks. 
 In our easy task the company could take on only five possible values, s=38, 60, 90, 130, 
or 240. These values were not evenly spaced for two reasons. First, it avoids placing the 
equilibrium bid at a corner of the choice space, where the most profitable activity is either to bid 
zero and never acquire the company or to bid the highest value and always acquire it. Such 
designs have advantages but can induce boredom. Placing the equilibrium bid away from the 
corners of the actions space is also likely to facilitate the convergence of groups with 
heterogeneous views on the correct solutions; the equilibrium bid was not in the middle of the 
action space, either. Second, to have distinct predictions for naive and rational bidders, while 
distancing the latter prediction from the middle of the action space, where there oftentimes are 
many confused subjects who would otherwise be mistaken for rational players (Holt and 
Sherman, 1994, Selten et al., 2005). In the difficult task the company could take on one hundred 




To sum up, the task was a decision problem with imperfect information. The 
informational obstacle of the buyer was offset by an assumption that the buyer's value was 1.5 
times the seller value, s. The optimal and naïve bidding strategies in this task were first modeled by 
Holt and Sherman (1994) in an environment with continuous strategy space wherecompany values 
for the seller are uniformly distributed between X and X+R. The expected gain to a buyer equals to 
the product between the value of the company less the amount bid for it and the probability of having 
the bid accepted. The latter can be represented by (b−X)/R, which is the probability that s is less than 
b. The optimal bidding strategy will necessarily consider that the seller accepts only if the company 
value is no higher than b. Hence, it incorporates the additional information that will be revealed by 
the event of winning. In case a bid b is accepted, the expected value for the seller will be in-between 
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 To make the decisional process more comparable across treatments, all treatments followed the same random draw 
procedure in the ―main‖ part. That is, every period the computer independently drew at random one company values 
for each group of three persons. In the individual treatment, even though there was no group decision making in the 




X and b, and more precisely X + (b−X)/2. For a risk-neutral rational bidder, the optimal bid 
maximizes the rational objective function below which is  the product of the acceptance probability 
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In contrast, a naive bidder is defined as someone who neglects the information conveyed by 
winning and assumes that the value of the company for him/her is 1.5(X + R/2), where X + R/2 is 
the expected value of s. This yields the naive objective indicated above. Based on this 
consideration one can derive the rational and naive bids as follow:  
 
                                                        
 
 





The predictions within the experimental treatment follow from this framework by 
considering a discrete strategy space. In the 5-value task, a bid of 60 is the risk-neutral Nash 
equilibrium (RNNE) strategy for the buyer and yields an expected profit of 5.4. Table 1 shows 
buyer’s profits for the RNNE strategy and other bidding strategies. Instead, an incorrect 
reasoning may lead some participants to bid 90 and earn an expected profit of 2.4, which is sub-
optimal. We computed this prediction following the model of naïve bidding in order to select a 
design for the experiment with a rational bid lower than the naïve bid. A naïve bidder does not 
condition the value of the company on the level of the accepted bid, rather, assumes that the 
value is always the expected value of s, which is 111.6. A naïve bidder erroneously thinks a bid 
of 90 would yield an expected profit of 0.6×(1.5×111.6 – 90)=46.44. Instead, when placing a bid 
of 90, the company is sold only for values 38, 60, 90 but not for 130 and 240. For a rational 
bidder, the expected value conditional on being accepted is not 111.6, but (38+60+90)/3 = 62.66.  
Thus, the expected profit is 2.4 (Table 1). When the buyer does not take into account that 
acceptance is itself an informative event, the buyer may overbid and even incur an expected loss. 




company, which ensures that the participants stayed engaged in the task.
8
 Similarly, in the 100-
value task, the RNNE bid is 42 and the naïve bid is 63.75. Any bid above 63 generates an 
expected loss. 
To favor learning, each participant observed the company value at the end of each period 
– even when the company was not acquired. There was a practice period with forced input. In all 
treatments, the initial six periods involved individual decision making and every period the 
computer randomly drew 15 company values, one for each participant (control part). 
The rules in the following twenty periods differed by treatment (main part). In the 
Individual treatment, the Acquiring a Company task continued to be individual decision making 
except that while submitting a bid, subjects also stated their confidence level in the bid (low, 
medium, high) without monetary incentives and could add a brief text with reasons for the choice 
of that bid, which only the experimenter could observe.  
In the Group treatment, participants faced the Acquiring a Company task in groups of 
three members, which were randomly formed at the beginning of the session and held fixed 
through the session. Every period included a proposal step, a chat step, and a bidding step. In the 
proposal step, subjects submitted an individual bid proposal, a confidence level in their proposal 
(low, medium, or high) without monetary incentives, and could also send a brief text explaining 
the proposed bid.
9
 This information was placed on a public board for all three group members to 
see. Participants then had two minutes to send free-form messages to others in their groups.
10
 
Messages were recorded. In the bidding step, subjects had up to three rounds to reach a 
consensus on their group bid without further possibility to chat. If there still was no unanimity, 
no group bid was submitted and group members earned zero profits for that period. Under a 
unanimity rule, subjects have strong incentives to listen to the reasons of every group member 
with a different opinion; subjects have also incentives for communicating clearly and 
convincingly one’s position to others in order to influence group decisions. 
Before the Acquiring a Company task, participants faced lottery tasks along the lines of 
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 Having 240 as the highest possible company value generates an adequate ―profit distance‖ of 7.5% between the 
RNNE bid of 60 and the naïve bid of 90. Consider that, after fixing the lower four company values, a highest 
possible company value of 183 generates equal profits for the 60 and the 90 bids.  
9
 Confidence levels are part of the cheap talk among group members. Incentivizing them would have likely biased 
the main bidding choice, which was the target of the experiment, and added complexity to the design. 
10
 In the chat window, participants received an id number 1-3 in the order they sent messages in that specific period. 
We asked participants to follow two basic rules: to be civil to one another and not use profanities, and not to identify 




Holt and Laury (2002) to measure risk attitude. A first part elicited individual risk attitude and a 
second part elicited group risk attitude. Each part comprised fifteen binary decisions between a 
―safe‖ and a ―risky‖ option. The safe option involved a deterministic earning (50 tokens) and the 
risky option was a lottery with either a 150 earning or 0 (see Table A3 in Appendix). The per-
capita expected payoffs were equal in the two tasks. Only one decision from the individual 
lottery part and one from the group lottery part was randomly selected for payment at the end of 
the session. Group members had to submit unanimous choices after chatting.
11
 The group 
composition was the same here and in the Acquiring the Company task.  Zhang and Casari 
(2012) fully illustrate design and results. The elicitation of risk attitudes both at the individual 
and at the group level was instrumental in interpreting the choices in the Acquiring a Company 
task.  
Participants started with a 200 token endowment in the control part and a 300 token 
endowment in the main part of the easy task. In the difficult task, we increase the endowment to 
250 and 400 respectively to account for the lower expected profit relative to the easy task. In 
equilibrium, the individual period earnings were identical between individual and group 
treatments in a given task. Subjects were paid for all periods.
12
 30 subjects participated in the 
Individual treatment and 60 in the Group treatment of the easy task and 15 in the Individual 
treatment and 30 in the Group treatment of the difficult task (Table 2). Participants were 
randomly recruited from the undergraduate campus population of Purdue University and nobody 
participated in more than one session. Instructions were read aloud and subjects received a 
written copy. Sessions were run on a z-tree application (Fischbacher, 2007) and lasted on 
average about two hours. A subject earned on average about $20 in the easy task and $25 in the 
difficult task, with a guaranteed minimum payment of $5. We paid $0.03 for each experimental 
token.  
 
                                                 
11
 There were a proposal phase, a chat phase, and a group choice phase. Everyone simultaneously made an 
individual proposal about each of the fifteen lottery choices. Participants could then chat with their group. Any line 
with disagreement was highlighted. If the choices of all three group members were identical for a specific decision 
line, then we had a group choice.  If case of disagreement, there were two other rounds of interaction. In case the 
group was still in disagreement in the line selected for payment, then earnings were zero for that part. 
12
 Note that when cumulative earnings were low, there was a problem of limited liability, which we will discuss in 
the Result section. The instruction explained: ―What if my earnings are negative?  They will be compensated with 
your other gains. More precisely, if you have a loss in a single period, it will decrease your cumulative earnings. If 
your cumulative earnings in this part are negative, they will decrease your earnings in other parts of the experiment. 




4. Main Results 
There are four main results from the Acquiring a Company experiment. Two measures of 
performance are considered: the fraction of optimal bids and the fraction of winner’s curse bids, 
e.g. those that yielded an expected loss. We single out winner’s curse bids from other sub-
optimal choices because they entail particularly severe departures from optimal bidding: in 
expectation a subject is better off bidding 0 – or not bidding at all by vetoing the group decision  
– rather than placing a winner’s curse bid.  
 
Result 1: In the individual treatment, there was no significant improvement in performance over 
time from the control part to the end of the main part in terms of fractions of optimal or winner’s 
curse bids. This result holds both for the easy and difficult tasks. 
 
We first present evidence supporting Result 1 for the easy task. Recall subjects could bid any 
integer value between 0 and 360. In the easy task, we consider (near) optimal bids those of 60 or 
61, in case subjects did not understand the tie-breaking rule, and winner’s curse bids those 
integers in the intervals [58, 59], [74, 89] or [95, 360]. Table 3 and Figure 1 report the 
descriptive statistics. Overall, in the individual treatment only a minority of bids were optimal: 
the initial fraction was 35.6% (control part) and it remained about constant, reaching 35.4% at 
the end of the main part (periods 13-20). This difference was non-significant according to a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (N=30, p=0.992).
13
 The fraction of winner’s curse bids was at an 
initial level of 20.0% and remained about constant at 19.2%. Also this difference was non-
significant according to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (N=30, p=0.339). 
In some cases overbidding may be rational because of limited liability issues. For 
instance a subject with a low cash balance can expect to earn more by bidding 240 instead of the 
equilibrium bid of 60 in the easy task or by bidding 120 instead of 42 in the difficult task.
14
 In 
the data, these occurrences involved only 1.5% of all bids in the easy task and none of the bids in 
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 All reported p-values are based on two-sided tests unless otherwise stated. 
14
 In the easy task (difficult task), bidding 240 (120) yields a positive profit with probability 0.2 (0.4) and a loss y 
with probability 0.8 (0.6). If the cash balance is below y=23.25 (y=57.8) the eventual loss is inconsequential. When 
y<23.25 (y<57.8) the expected profit from a 240 (120) bid are higher than 5.4 (1.1) i.e. the expected profits from an 
optimal bid. Two caveats are in order. First, we guaranteed a $5 minimum earnings, which translates into 166.6 
tokens, hence the relevant threshold for cash balances is 189.9 (224.4). Second, the reference cash balance includes 
the expected earnings from the individual lottery part and 2 lotteries, the part 3 and 4 endowments and the 




the difficult task. Hence, keeping those observations affected by limited liability issues does not 
affect the main results.
15
  
In the difficult task, we consider (near) optimal bids those in the range [31, 53] while 
winner’s curse bids those in the range [64, 360].
16
 Overall, in the individual treatment for the 
difficult task the fraction of optimal bids was 15.6% in the control part and 22.5% in the end of 
the main part. This difference was non-significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, N=15, p=0.234). 
The fraction of winner’s curse bids remained about constant, from 70.0% in the control part to 
68.3% in the end of the main part. This difference was non-significant according to Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests (N=15, p=0.455). 
 
Result 2: In the easy task, by the end of the main part groups performed significantly better over 
time from the control part in terms of the fraction of optimal and winner’s curse bids. The 
significant improvement took place in the transition to group decision-making and not from 
experience. 
 
Result 3: In the difficult task, by the end of the main part there were no significant improvements 
of groups with respect to the control part in terms of the fraction of optimal and winner’s curse 
bids. In the transition to group decision-making, group performance became significantly worse 
than in the control part, and then significantly improved with experience. 
 
Table 3 and Figures 1 provide support for Results 2 and 3. In the easy task of the group 
treatment, the fraction of optimal bids increased from an initial level of 30.6% (control part) to 
51.9% in the end of the main part (periods 13-20). In addition, the fraction of winner’s curse bids 
declined from an initial level of 18.3% to 10.6%. These differences were both significant 
according to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (N=20, p=0.038 and N=20, p=0.026, respectively). The 
improvement took place in periods 1-6 of the main part during the transition from individual to 
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 Table 3 includes those observations. We dropped them instead from all following statistical and regression 
analyses. 
16
 In the difficult task, the optimal bid is 42. The range of near optimal bids covers 22% of the action space to 
include also approximately optimal bids and to facilitate the statistical comparison with the easy task, where the 
optimal bid is linked to one of the five company value (20% chance in case of random uniform choice). The 
expected profit from a bid of 31 is the same as from a bid of 53. In both easy and difficult tasks, near optimal bids 




group decision-making (N=20, p=0.108 for optimal bids and N=20, p=0.035 for winner’s curse 
bids, respectively). No difference is observed when we compare the first 6 periods to the end of 
the main part (N=20, p=0.376 for optimal bids and N=20, p=0.932 for winner’s curse bids, 
respectively).  Hence, it was the effect of group membership more than group learning (Figure 
1). 
 
 Instead, in the difficult task of the group treatment, the fraction of optimal bids at the 
initial level of 22.2% (control part) were not significantly different from the 17.5% at the end of 
the main part (periods 13-20) according to a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (N=20, p=0.259). The 
fraction of winner’s curse bids declined from 64.4% to 48.8% but this difference was non-
significant according to Wilcoxon signed-rank test (N=10, p=0.202).  This overall picture of 
non-significant change hides two opposite shifts (Figure 1). First, the transition from individual 
to group decision-making that caused a worsening of performance, with optimal bids at 6.7% and 
winner’s curse bids at 75% in periods 1-6 of the main part (only the former is significantly 
different between control part and the first 6 periods of main part, N=10, p=0.040). Second, 
group learning caused a significant improvement of performance (comparing periods 1-6 to 
periods 13-20 of the main part: N=10, p=0.084 for optimal bids and N=10, p=0.011 for winner’s 
curse bids, respectively). 
Another way to assess performance is to trace groups over time. In the easy task, most 
groups exhibited an improvement in bid quality over time (Figure 2). One can measure the 
improvement by comparing the average quality bid score in the earlier periods (1, 2, 3) versus 
the later periods (17, 18, 19). We did not include the last period to avoid catching end-of-game 
effects and considered three-period intervals to account for rotating strategies among group 
members. When average scores did not change, the tie-breaking rule was the average quality 
score of the proposed bids in the earlier vs. later periods. We report that 14 groups exhibited an 
improvement (70%), 1 group stayed constant, and 5 groups got worse. In the individual 
treatment, the improvement over time in the main part was less frequent. We report that 12 
individuals exhibited an improvement (40%), 7 individuals stayed constant, and 11 individuals 
got worse. This difference is significant according to a Fisher’s exact test on the percentage of 
improved groups and individuals (p= 0.048). Also in the difficult task there was an improvement, 
although smaller. We report that 6 groups exhibited an improvement (60%), 3 group stayed 




main part was less frequent. We report that 7 individuals exhibited an improvement (46.7%), 1 
individual stayed constant, and 7 individuals got worse. This difference is not significant on the 
percentage of improved groups and individuals (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.688). 
 
Result 4: Over time the fraction of optimal bids followed opposite trajectories in the easy vs. the 
difficult task. The change from the control part to the end of the main part significantly favoured 
the group treatment over the individual treatment in the easy task. The opposite was true for the 
difficult task. 
 
Support for Result 4 is in Table 3. In the easy task the fraction of optimal bids increased and the 
fraction of winner’s curse bids decreased from the control to the main part in both treatments. 
The absolute magnitude of these improvements, though, was larger in the group treatment than in 
the individual treatment: +19.9 vs. +1.9 for optimal bids and -8.5 vs. -1.9 for winner’s curse bids. 
These differences across treatments are marginally significant for the fraction of optimal bids 
(Robust Rank Order tests: n=30, m=20, one-tailed asymptotic p=0.057), and for the fraction of 
winner’s curse bids (Robust Rank Order tests: n=30, m=20, one-tailed asymptotic p=0.057). The 
pattern was rather different in the difficult task. The direction and magnitude of the 
improvements in the difficult task actually disfavored the group treatment over the individual 
treatment: -9.2 vs. +7.1 for optimal bids and -3.9 vs. -4.3 for winner’s curse bids. These 
differences across treatments are statistically significant for the fraction of optimal bids (Robust 
Rank Order tests: n=15, m=10, p=0.006).
17
 The poor group outcome in terms of optimal bidding 
in the difficult task is in line with the results of previous studies on group bidding in auctions, 
where group decision making did not substantially improve performance (Cox and Hayne, 2006, 
Sutter et al., 2009). In Section 6 we provide a unified interpretation for this and other results.  
  
5. Additional Results 
Why and when do groups outperform individuals? This section discusses interpretations and 
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 In the control part, there are no significant differences in the fraction of optimal bids and fraction of winner’s 
curse bids across individual and group treatments for both the easy and difficult tasks (Robust Rank Order tests: 
n=30, m=60, p=0.189 for optimal bids and p=0.426 for winner’s curse bids in the easy task. In the difficult task, 
n=15, m=30, p=0.246 for optimal bids and p=0.369 for winner’s curse bids). Thus clearly the superiority of groups 




qualifications for the main findings in the form of four additional results. Results 5 and 6 open 
the section by presenting evidence on how individual bid proposals are combined into a final 
group bid in the main part. 
Result 5: Groups underperformed with respect to a “truth wins” benchmark. 
In intellective tasks, such as the Acquiring a Company task, one smart person who knows the 
optimal bidding strategy can explain it to the other two group members and hence prove to them 
the superiority of his or her proposal.
18
 In a well-working group, this may well happen but it 
actually did not in the experiment. Consider the following back-of-the-envelope calculations. In 
the easy task, about 30.6% of control part bids were optimal. Absent any learning, the chances 
that at least one group member proposed the optimal strategy were 66.4%, which contrasts with 
the considerably lower level of 50.5% in the main part (Table 3)
19
. In the difficult task, about 
22.2% of control part bids were optimal, which amount to a predicted optimal strategy of 52.9% 
to be compared with the actual 13.0% level.
20
 Hence, the group does not meet the truth-wins 
norm, which is also in line with Charness et al. (2010)’s finding about conjunction fallacy 
reasoning.  
A key design feature of the Group treatment was the posting of individual bid proposals 
before starting the group discussion; hence there is a complete record of ex-ante agreement or 
disagreement among group members. There was lively disagreement within groups: overall ex-
ante disagreement is present in about 53.8% of cases of the easy task and 61.0% of cases in the 
difficult task. We label as disagreement a case where at least one member’s initial bid proposal 
was different from the final group bid. Ex-ante disagreement reduced over time from 66.7% 
(periods 1-6) to 45.6% (period 13-20) in the easy task and from 68.3% to 55% in the difficult 
task.  At the end of each period, though, all groups eventually reached a unanimous decision. A 
group-by-group analysis focused on winner’s curse bids confirms the underperformance of 
groups with respect to a truth wins norm when dealing with an Acquiring a Company task (Table 
4). 
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 At the beginning of each period, subjects must make a proposal in the pre-discussion stage which worked as an 
open brick for their discussion and also saved their chat time which was up to 2 minutes. There were 15 periods 
involved. Thus the smart subject had 30 minutes in total to explain the strategy to the other two. 
19
 The difference is significant at 10% (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, n=20, p-value=0.09, one sample t-test p-value=0.08). 
20





In the Group treatment, individual proposals are not incentivized. Hence, they may be 
cheap talk employed to influence group decision making in case of disagreement. In the initial 
periods it is more likely that proposals would be truthful as a subject does not know how others 
would approach the task. In later periods, subjects knew that often time the median proposal or 
close to median proposal prevailed. Thus if a subject preferred bid is the median among her 
group members, there is no incentive to change it. In case it is different from the median, it will 
most likely not be chosen; hence the subject could inflate it in the attempt to pull the group 
decision more in the direction of his preferred bid. From the experimental data, it is unclear how 
relevant this phenomenon could have been and how effective it may have been. For the purpose 
of our analysis it has only a minor impact as we consider the ranking of bids and not their 
absolute magnitude. 
 
Result 6: If there was disagreement among group members, in most cases the group bid 
coincided with the median proposal, both in the easy and difficult tasks. 
 
In the easy task, the final group bid was the median proposal, or closest to the median, in 
76.7% of the cases; it was better in 6.5% of the cases and worse in 16.7% of the cases. In the 
difficult task the pattern was similar, as the final group bid was the median proposal, or closest to 
the median, in 68.0% of the cases; it was better in 14.8% of the cases and worse in 17.2% of the 
cases.
21
 Hence, the evidence points toward a median aggregation rule for group decisions. As we 
will discuss below, a median aggregation rule could explain both the positive performance of 
groups in the easy task and their poor performance in the difficult task. In order to understand 
how the group dynamic aggregated diverging opinions, here we study exclusively situations of 
disagreement. Probit regressions study the subsample of groups in disagreement in two distinct 
specifications (marginal effects are reported in Table 5). The dependent variable was 1 when an 
individual proposal became a group choice, 0 otherwise. Regressors included whether the 
proposal was a median as well as common to the majority, whether it was a median but not 
common to the majority, and whether it was the proposal in the group that yielded the highest 
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 Some group bids were different from all the individual proposals of group members (3% in the easy task and 28% 
in the difficult task). The classification in the main text assigned those cases according to the closest distance in 
terms of expected profit between the group bids and each of the individual proposals. The regressions in Table 4, 




expected payoff. Demographic regressors included risk attitude, confidence level, college major, 
and gender. Period dummies were also included but not reported in the table.  
Some regressions pool data from periods 1-6 and others pool data from periods 7-20. The 
comparison between the regressions using the first 6 and the last 14 periods allowed us to 
examine the change in the determinants of group outcome across time. The main result from the 
first specification is that the median proposal was the strongest determinant of group choice, 
especially when it was common to a majority. Such strong impact remains over time. In the 
second specification, it emerges that the best proposal was no more likely to be chosen in group 
choices, which suggests that the ―truth wins‖ norm (Lorge and Solomon, 1955) does not apply to 
this experiment. Risk preferences of the proponent had unclear effects on the proponent’s impact 
on group choices while male participants were significantly more likely to influence the group 
choices in one specification of the difficult task. High confidence and major did not seem to be 
important factors.  
One aspect that needs clarification is how group decisions strictly based on the median 
bid proposal could still improve performance in the Acquiring a Company task. We ran period 
by period simulations by taking the median bid among three random bids drawn from the pool of 
individual bids that subjects placed in that period in a given part in the individual treatment. For 
the group treatment, we used individual bids in the simulation for the control part and individual 
proposals for the main part. We consider averages of 6000 simulations for each period. When 
comparing the actual results from Table 4 to the simulation results, one can see that a mechanical 
aggregation of the individual bids into a group choice using the median rule improves bidding in 
the easy task, in particular it should lead to a reduction of about half of the frequency of winner’s 
curse bids, from 18.3% to 9.4% (See Table A2, simulations on the main part of the Individual 
treatment)
22
. This reduction is similar to what one observes in the experimental data for the main 
part of the Group treatment (9.8%, Table 3). While encouraging, the result that groups 
outperform individuals does not extend to the difficult task where a majority of bids are winner’s 
curse bids. In the difficult task, the mechanical median aggregation rule results in a decrease of 
the fraction of optimal bids from the observed 22.7% (individual treatment main part) to 16.76%, 
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 The difference is significant at 10% according to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, n=30, p-value=0.07 and 5% 




a level similar to the observed data in the group treatment (13%).
23
  
Hence, a median aggregation rule in group decision can explain the better performance of 
groups compared to individuals with respect to placing winner’s curse bids in the easy task and 
worse performance in the difficult task.   
 
Result 7: Participants employed the veto power less often than optimal. 
 
 The design set strong incentives for subjects to communicate and negotiate within the 
group because every group member had veto power on the final bid. If there was disagreement 
on the group choice, the group lost the opportunity to place a bid for the period and everyone in 
the group earned zero.
24
 The veto power could have been usefully employed by a subject every 
time others in the group wanted to place a winner’s curse bid. For risk neutral and risk averse 
participants, a sure gain of zero is preferred to an expected loss. Did participants employ such 
veto power? Less often than what would have been necessary to avoid all expected losses. First, 
there was no case where groups did not reach a final bid by the third trial. Second, the 
aggregation of winner’s curse proposals did not differ from the aggregation of proposals in 
general (Table 4). Our conjecture is that Result 7 is due to pressure to conform in group decision 
making. In the easy task, when the proposal of one member was a winner’s curse bid and the 
other two were not, it prevailed in 25.0% of the cases. When the proposals of two members were 
winner’s curse bids and the other was not, it prevailed in 77.8% of the cases. In the difficult task, 
when the proposal of one member was a winner’s curse bid and the other two were not, it 
prevailed in 30.4% of the cases. When the proposals of two members were winner’s curse bids 
and the other was not, it prevailed in 75.0% of the cases. These percentages are in line with those 
stated in Result 6. In the hypothetical case that a subject with a non-winner’s curse proposal 
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 The difference is not statistically significant according to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, n=15, p-value= 0.733 and 
one sample t-test p-value=0.369. 
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 Existing studies of group decision making greatly differ on this point, which crucially affects the incentives for 
communicating with others and for convincing others of one's opinion (Zhang and Casari, 2012). Cooper and Kagel 
(2005) randomly select one member’s proposal as the group choice. Blinder and Morgan (2005) and Gillet et al. 
(2009) either implement a majority rule or give members no time limit to reach a unanimous decision. Kocher and 
Sutter (2007) is the most closely related paper with a veto power feature. In a gift-exchange game, Kocher and 
Sutter allowed groups of three up to 10 rounds to reach agreement. If there was no agreement in the 10
th
 round, each 
group member received only a show-up fee. Only one group failed to reach an agreement. They didn’t analyze the 
effect of such veto power though. Kagel et al. (2010) studied the veto power in a committee where only one of the 




always vetoed group decisions for a winner’s curse bid, in the group treatment, in the easy task 
only 1.5% of bids would have been winner’s curse in the main part (and not 9.7%). The 
corresponding percentages in the difficult task are 48.0% and 60.5%, respectively. In other 
words, a rational use of veto power could have substantially reduced the fraction of winner’s 
curse bids. Participants simply did not employ it as much as they could.  
Another factor affecting bidding is risk preferences. For a risk neutral buyer the Nash 
Equilibrium (RNNE) strategy is to bid 60. A risk averse buyer, instead, may choose a ―safe‖ bid 
of 38 while a risk seeking one may place a ―naive‖ bid of 90. Subjects show considerable 
awareness of the risk characterizing the task when writing up reasons for their bid proposals and 
often interpret the task as choice over lotteries. For instance, a bid of 38 is called the ―Safest 
Bet,‖ and a bid of 60 is described as ―... a 1/5 chance of gaining 30 tokens and 1/5 chance of 
losing 3 tokens..conservative.‖ Another subject writes: ―if we chose 90 then we can only lose 33 
chips and can win 45..with 130 you can lose 73 or 40 and win 5 or 65. 240 is just not worth it.‖ 
Here we investigate whether the shift in risk preference due to group decision making may 
explain the bid improvement from the Individual to the Group treatment.
25
 The question is 
empirical and refers to this specific setting.  If there is a systematic tendency of individuals 
interacting in groups to take less risk than the same individuals deciding in isolation, then groups 
will lower their bids in the Acquiring a Company task. Without an independent task to measure 
shifts in risk preferences, one could erroneously attribute an improvement in performance of 
groups over individuals to superior group rationality instead of a shift in risk preferences. The 




Result 8: The shift in revealed risk preference generated by group decision-making cannot 
explain the better performance of groups over individuals in the Acquiring a Company task. 
 
Each group made 15 lottery choices for a total of 675 group decisions (group lottery part). We 
measured agreement by comparing individual choices in lotteries and group lottery choices. In 
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 The observed levels of risk attitude cannot explain the winner’s curse phenomenon in the Individual treatment. 
Approximately 10% of the participants showed risk seeking behaviour, and hence 90% of bids should be either 38 or 
60 in the easy task (see Table A3). Instead, they were 47.5%. This finding by itself is an important result for the 
winner’s curse literature in general: the origin of the winner’s curse when participants decide in isolation does not 
lie in the risk attitude of participants. 
26




67.4% of the group decisions, there was unanimous agreement in the group. Overall, we found 
that group choices over lotteries were closer to the behavior of a risk neutral agent than 





6. Discussion and Conclusions 
Many bidders are naïve and often fall prey into the winner’s curse, which is a widespread 
behavioral bias in the field and in the lab where people systematically incur losses when trying to 
acquire an item in a variety of settings. These settings include mineral right auctions, some eBay 
auctions, baseball’s free agency market, IPOs pricing and corporate takeovers. Our aim is not to 
find the origin of naïve bidding or of the winner’s curse but to study whether, and under what 
conditions, deciding in groups improves bidding and how this result is achieved.  
In the simplified version of the Acquiring a Company task, we document the impact of 
four factors in group decision making under a unanimity rule. First, we report that individual 
opinions are combined into a group decision largely through a median-aggregation rule. When 
in disagreement, three out of four groups’ choices in the easy task and two out of three in the 
difficult task are led by the opinion of the median member (Result 6). The Acquiring a Company 
task is an intellective task, where the dominant decision scheme is ―truth wins,‖ and groups are 
expected to perform at the level of the best individual in the group (Lorge and Solomon, 1955). 
We report that group performance falls short of the ―truth wins‖ benchmark (Result 5). When in 
disagreement, controlling for risk attitude and some demographic characteristics – the best 
proposal in a group is no more likely to emerge than other proposals. Earlier papers compare 
group choices with simulations on individual choices in between-subject design (Cooper and 
Kagel, 2005, 2009). In addition to that, this study provides direct evidence by matching each 
group choice with the corresponding individual proposals of its group members. When two 
people do not get the correct solution, bringing a smart person into the group will not be enough, 
on average, to overturn the group decisions. The Acquiring a Company task is a demonstrable 
intellective task but it is as if subjects in small groups of three played it out as a judgmental task 
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 Table A3 in Appendix reports the detailed results. The fraction of risk neutral and risk seeking groups was lower 
than the fraction of risk neutral and risk seeking individuals (14.4% vs. 13.64%). The bulk of the choices reflected 





before they learned to solve it. Such evidence unveils one reason why the winner's curse is so 
difficult to overcome.  Even many of those who place an optimal bid don't seem to be aware of 
having correctly solved the task and are unable to overturn the group choice by effectively 
arguing that their proposal is the best.  Furthermore, it also sheds light on a factor behind the lack 
of predictive power of the ―truth-wins‖ model in these tasks.  It isn't enough that a task be 
demonstrable intellective. For the truth-wins model to work, participants must experience a 
eureka moment for grasping the solution and then be able to unambiguously communicate this 
solution to others in the group, which was not the case neither in the easy or the in the difficult 
Acquiring a Company task in this study. 
Our findings thus add nicely to the early psychology literature that postulates that a 
majority aggregation rule fits best for judgmental tasks that required consensus on a collective 
decision (Laughlin, 1999, Davis, 1992). The observed underperformance of groups in the 
difficult task is consistent with the findings in psychology and economics studies that when 
groups are facing tasks where individuals are likely to make intuitively appealing but incorrect 
judgments, groups tend to make poorer decisions than individuals (for instance, Smith et al. 
1998; Hinsz et al. 2008, Charness et al., 2015).
28
 Moreover, relative to individuals, the same 
aggregation rule results in superior group performance in the easy task and inferior performance 
in the difficult task (Results 2, 3, 6). This result supports the argument that the same decision 
process can lead to different group outcomes (Tindale et al. 2012).
29
  
Second, in line with the experimental literature on group decision making, we find some 
evidence that groups learn faster than individuals (Results 2, 3 and 4). In our experiment, there 
is no significant learning by individuals who bid in an Acquiring a Company task (Result 1). We 
report substantial learning with experience by groups in the difficult task in terms of frequency 
of optimal bids and winner’s curse bids (Result 3). We did not make headway in what exactly 
drives group learning. Feri et al. (2010) for instance argue that groups in coordination games are 
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 Smith et al. (1998) show that two person minorities can often persuade three person majorities to continue 
investing in a project that is falling. Hinsz et al. (2008) find groups are more likely to suffer from the base rate 
neglect problem than individuals.  
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 Tindale et al. (2012) show that ―social sharedness‖ – one of the basic group processes can lead to considerably 







more attracted by payoff-dominant choices than individuals deciding in isolation. This may be a 
behavioral force behind group learning also in this setting, where the main issue is instead the 
level of rationality. Nonetheless, repeated interaction emerges as a key factor to achieve a high 
group performance. One can only speculate that a longer interaction in the difficult task would 
have also improved group performance with respect to individual decision making. 
Third, another likely factor in group decision making is herd behavior (Result 7). We 
provide indirect support on this point. While there was a group dynamic to converge to a middle 
ground as a compromise, some evidence suggests that there also existed another dynamic of herd 
behavior at play. Such behavior may take the explicit form of pressure from the majority or 
could be implicit, a self-retreat to conform to the majority. For instance, when there was an ex-
ante disagreement, the median was more likely to prevail in two-against-one situations than with 
three distinct opinions.  Another way to detect the role of minority opinion is to look at the use of 
veto power. The veto power could have been usefully employed by a subject every time others in 
the group wanted to place a winner’s curse bid because everyone generally prefers a sure gain of 
zero to an expected loss. Subjects exerted veto power substantially less often than optimal (Table 
4).  
 Fourth, we can rule out that the superiority of groups over individuals in the easy version 
of the Acquiring a Company task is due to shifts in risk attitudes generated by group processes 




The above factors, but especially the median-aggregation rule, can provide a unified 
explanation for our experimental results. Groups of three members facing an intellective task can 
sometimes make better choices than individuals in isolation but in other situations show no 
improvement or a worsening in performance due to the transition from individual to group 
decision making. It depends on the combination of learning and of the process of aggregating 
individual proposals into a group choice. If groups follow the median opinion of their members, 
one would expect groups to perform better than individuals in easy tasks, because a large 
majority of individual subjects already avoids major mistakes such as winner's curse bids in the 
Acquiring a Company task. The same aggregation rule applied in a difficult task can lead to no 
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improvement in the frequency of optimal bids by groups. If the task is very difficult, it could also 
make group decisions worse than individuals deciding in isolation.  One would expect this result 
the larger is the share of individual subjects who fails to place near-optimal bids. Predictions 
following from this aggregation rule differ for tasks with internal vs. corner solutions. Groups are 
expected to fare better in tasks such as the one in the present experiment with an internal 
solution, given that – for any level of confusion or random error – it is harder for the median to 
coincide with a corner value of the action space. 
 The median-aggregation rule can also explain the experimental results of earlier 
experiments on group decision making. With auctions, groups did not seem to help much in 
overcoming the winner’s curse or raising profits (Cox and Hayne, 2006, Sutter et al., 2009). Our 
findings do not contradict these results and may actually shed light on them. The Acquiring a 
Company task in the present study presents two major differences from those auctions: it is 
easier to solve and demonstrate the correct answer, and it does not involve competition with 
other subjects. In Cox and Hayne (2006) the experimental task was very difficult: ―both 
individuals and groups are very subject to the winner’s curse when they are inexperienced‖ 
(p.217). A similar issue applies to Sutter et al. (2009). Besides the level of difficulty, individual 
vs. group decision making in auction experiments may yield results different from ours because 
auctions generate issues of information aggregation and competition with other potential buyers 
that are ruled out by design under Acquiring a Company tasks with robot sellers. Further 
research may address the impact of competitive aspects in cognitively complex tasks in group-
decision making.   
This paper suggests that groups perform well when a majority of individuals are able to 
overcome naïve bidding. Further research is needed to understand under what collective decision 
making rule, such as unanimity, majority, private or public message exchange, electronic or face-
to-face communication, a minority can convince the group about the correct solution. Another 
open issue is how the above four factors play within groups of different sizes. For instance, one 
needs groups of three or larger to test a median-aggregation rule or herd behavior; or, larger 
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Same Process, Different Outcomes: Group Performance in an Acquiring a Company Experiment 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Buyer’s profits for selected bids –5-value version 
  
Profits  
depending on the company value s 
Expected 
Bid, b s = 38 s = 60 s = 90 s = 130 s = 240 profits 
       
38 (loss free) 19 0 0 0 0 3.8 
60 (optimal) -3 30 0 0 0 5.4 
90 (naïve) -33 0 45 0 0 2.4 
130 -73 -40 5 65 0 -8.6 
240 -183 -150 -105 -45 120 -72.6 
 
 










Individual treatment 30 2 
Group treatment 60 (20) 4 
100-values 
(difficult task) 
Individual treatment 15 1 








Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 
 5-value (easy task) 100-value (difficult task) 
 Individual treatment Group treatment Individual treatment Group treatment 
  control part main part control part main part control part main part control part main part 
Percentage of Bids by type         
  
 (Near) Optimal: bids that yield 
       highest expected profit 
35.6 37.5 30.6 50.5 15.6 22.7 22.2 13.0 
 
  Suboptimal: bids that yield  
        positive expected profits 
44.4 44.2 51.1 39.8 14.4 11.7 13.3 26.5 
 
  Winner’s curse: bids that yield  
       negative expected profits  
 
20.2 18.3 18.3 9.8 70.0 65.7 64.4 60.5 
Realized Profits (per period)  -1.65 0.4 1.21 2.13 -2.83 -0.75 -0.5 -2.4 
Number of obs., Number of subjects 180, 30 600, 30 360, 60 400,60 90, 15 300, 15 180, 30 200, 30 
 
Note: In the 5-value treatment, optimal bid includes 60 and 61; winner’s curse bids are in the ranges [58, 59], [74, 89] and [95, 360]. 







Table 4: Aggregation of individual proposals into a group choice 
Group treatment, Main part 





No. of winner’s cursed bids 
Group classification based  




Expected with truth wins 
norm or veto power 
No winner's curse proposals 304 912 3 0 0 
There is only one winner’s curse proposal  72 216 54 0 0 
There are two winner’s curse proposals  18 54 42 54 0 
All winner's curse proposals 6 18 18 18 18 
Totals 400 1,200 117 72 18 
Frequency of winner’s curse (out of 1200)  10.5% 9.7% 6.0% 1.5% 
 





No. of winner’s cursed bids 
Group classification based  




Expected with truth wins 
norm or veto power 
No winner's curse proposals 57 171 0 0 0 
There is only one winner’s curse proposal  23 69 21 0 0 
There are two winner’s curse proposals  24 72 54 72 0 
All winner's curse proposals 96 288 288 288 288 
Totals 200 600 363 360 288 
Frequency of winner’s curse (out of 600) 
 










Table 5: Solving disagreement among individual proposals 
Group treatment, Main part 
 
 5-value 100-value 5-value 100-value 
Dependent variable: All obs. All obs. All obs. All obs. Periods Periods Periods Periods 
1=individual proposal 
became group choice, 
Periods Periods Periods Periods 1-6 7-20 1-6 7-20 
0= otherwise 1-6 7-20 1-6 7-20 
    
  (a) (a) (b) (b) (c) (c) (d) (d) 
         
Proposal is median and 
majority 
0.66*** 0.69*** 0.46*** 0.67*** 
    
 
(0.115) (0.077) (0.160) (0.110) 
    
Proposal is median but 
not majority 
0.03 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.35** 
    
 
(0.133) (0.069) (0.128) (0.162) 
    
Among group proposals, 
it yields the highest 
0.18 -0.1 -0.01 -0.07 
    
expected profit (0.123) (0.098) (0.177) (0.067) 
    
Proposal is winner's curse 
    
-0.34** -0.09 -0.11 0.14 
     
(0.145) (0.182) (0.177) (0.111) 
Proposal is optimal 
    
-0.19 -0.05 -0.37*** 0.17 
     
(0.164) (0.103) (0.055) (0.164) 
Subject is risk averse  -0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.31** -0.01 0.16 0.05 
   (switch point>13) (0.102) (0.108) (0.120) (0.076) (0.132) (0.067) (0.150) (0.081) 
Subject is risk seeking  -0.31*** -0.08 0.22 ^ 0.01 -0.09 0.46** ^ 
   (switch point<8) (0.079) (0.150) (0.198) 
 
(0.128) (0.194) (0.182) 
 
High confidence proposal -0.1 0.11 0.05 -0.06 0.04 0.06 0.16 -0.01 
 
(0.113) (0.078) (0.081) (0.105) (0.201) (0.099) (0.114) (0.118) 
Economics and Business 
major 
-0.05 -0.08 0.13 0.12 -0.08 -0.16 0.14 0.21* 
 
(0.068) (0.114) (0.154) (0.115) (0.115) (0.113) (0.158) (0.116) 
Male 0.14 -0.01 0.12 0.13** 0.03 -0.14 0.15 0.09* 
 
(0.094) (0.067) (0.107) (0.052) (0.126) (0.109) (0.111) (0.054) 
Number of obs., Number 
of subjects 
230, 59 386, 45 123, 30 243, 30 98, 38 172, 36 123, 30 222, 21 
Pseudo R-squared 0.388 0.349 0.198 0.321 0.11 0.0524 0.0978 0.0902 
Log likelihood -96.57 -172.8 -64.31 -107.2 -60.26 -112.9 -72.36 -129.2 
Notes: Marginal effects from probit regression with robust standard errors (clusters on groups). Significance 
levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Specifications (a), (b) include all individual proposals unless all identical 
within the group in a given period (616 obs. in 5-value; 366 obs. in 100-value) Specifications (c) and (d) include 
all the observations when there is a disagreement in the proposal stage with at least one proposal is a winners’ 
cursed bid (270 obs. in 5-value; 345 in 100-value) and when the final group decision is winner’s cursed bid even 
though none of the proposals are winner’s cursed bids (3 obs. in 5-value; 0 obs. in 100-value). ^ r_seeking 
dropped due to collinearity. Observations affected by limited liability issues are excluded. Period dummies are 



















5-value (easy task) 















Notes: This figure displays the fractions of optimal bids (left panel), winner’s curse bids (middle panel) 
and dispersed bids (right panel) average across four segments of time. The first data point in each panel 
is the average of 6 periods in the control part. The next three points report the average fraction of bids 






















100-value (difficult task) 













Figure 2: Group choices over time 
 




Notes: This figure shows for each group the evolution of the final group bid (solid line) and the 
individual bid proposals (dashed lines). Each panel represents a single group (N=20). Bids are mapped 
into a quality score ranging from – 2 (worst bids) to + 3 (best bids). The score for any other bid not 
present on the vertical axis is the average value of the two closest bids in terms of profits: 2.5, 1.5, 0,  
-1.5. Bids above 240 are coded with -3. Comparing the group performance between periods 1-3 and 
periods 17-19 based on the average quality score of the final bid with the average score of the 
proposals as a tie-breaking rule, we report that 14 groups exhibited an improvement (panel 2-15), 1 
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Notes: This figure shows for each group the evolution of the final group bid (solid line) and the 
individual bid proposals (dashed lines). Each panel represents a single group (N=10). Bids above 64 
(the red horizontal line) is winner’s curse bid. Comparing the group performance between periods 1-3 
and periods 17-19 based on the average expected payoff of the final bid, we report that 6 groups 
exhibited an improvement (panels 1-5 and 8), 3 groups stayed constant (panels 6, 9, 10) and 1 group 
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Table A1: Experimental studies of the acquiring a company game 













in choice set 
No. repetitions 
Casari et al. 
(2015: this study) 
5 values 38 240  Y 11% 26 
100 values 21 120  Y 22% 26 
Ball, Bazerman, 
Carroll (1991) 
Baseline 0 100 Y Y 0% 20 
Role Reversal 0 100 Y Y 0% 20 





























4 values 0 99  Y 0% 60 
Cooper and Sutter 
(2011)  
3 values 90 1200  Y 5% 40 
Holt and Sherman 
(1994) 
Winner's Curse 1.5 6 Y Y 33% 30 
No Curse 1 3 Y Y 50% 30 
Loser's Curse 0.5 1 Y Y 100% 30 
Selton, Abbink, 
and Cox (2005) 
Lower bound of  1 1 99 Y  0-1% 100 
Lower bound of 11 11 99 Y  11-13% 100 
Lower bound of 21 21 99 Y  26-27% 100 
Bereby-Meyer and 
Grosskopf (2008) 
Control 0 100 Y Y 0% 100 
Yes-No Decision 1st 0 100 Y Y 0% 100 
Average Full 
Feedback 
0 100 Y Y 0% 100 
Average Only 0 100 Y Y 0% 100 




Control 0 100 Y Y 0% 100, 5 parts  
Varying k 0 100 Y  0%, 100% 100, 5 parts 
Sym-Asym 0 100 Y Y 0%, 51% 100, 5 parts 
Sym-Asym Compar. 0 100 Y Y 0%, 51% 100, 5 parts 
Exper 2: Control 0 100 Y Y 0%, 51% 80+20 switch 




Control 0 100 Y Y 0% 1 
High Motives 0 100 Y Y 0% 1 
Training (x4) 0 100 Y Y 0% 1 
Exper. Mngrs 0 100 Y Y 0% 1 
Exper. Bankers 0 100 Y Y 0% 1 
Tor and Bazerman 
(2003) 
  0 100 Y Y 0% 1 
Notes to Table A1: The subjects were undergraduate students except in the following studies. Ball, Bazerman, Carroll (1991) used 1st 
year Master students; Bereby-Meyer and Grosskopf (2008) used Boston area people, varied in education and background; Grosskopf, 
Bereby-Meyer, Bazerman (2007) used Boston area people, age 18 to 60; Carroll, Delquie, Halpern, Bazerman (1990) used 1st year 
Master's students in OBHR class, 2nd year Master's students in advanced Marketing class, Managers in a weeklong seminar and 
Master's graduates in investment banking; Tor and Bazerman (2003) used both graduate and undergraduate students. Other papers 
used standard undergraduate students as subjects. 
Table A2: Descriptive statistics on simulated median bids  
 
 5-value (easy task) 100-value (difficult task) 
 Individual treatment Group treatment Individual treatment Group treatment 
  control part main part control part main part control part main part control part main part 
Simulated median bid distribution            
(percentages) 
        
 
(Near) Optimal: bids that yield 
       highest expected profit 
33.97 44.40 36.58 60.13 8.16 16.76 15.47 7.74 
 
Suboptimal: bids that yield  
        positive expected profits 
53.99 46.24 53.48 36.41 14.13 11.33 13.66 28.54 
 
Winner’s curse: bids that yield  
       negative expected profits  
12.04 9.36 9.94 3.46 77.71 71.92 70.87 63.72 
 
Number of simulated observations 36000 120000 36000 120000 36000 120000 36000 120000 
 
Notes: In the group treatment, Main part, the simulations were run on the individual proposed bids without regard for the experimental  
group membership. 
 





















Range of CRRA If 
switch from A to B at 









1 50 150 or 0 0 0 r<-1.73 0.00 0.00 
2 50 150 or 0 0.05 7.5 -1.73<r<-1.1 0.00 0.00 
3 50 150 or 0 0.1 15 -1.1<r<-0.73 0.00 0.00 
4 50 150 or 0 0.15 22.5 -0.73<r<-0.47 0.00 0.00 
5 50 150 or 0 0.2 30 -0.47<r<-0.27 1.69 0.00 
6 50 150 or 0 0.25 37.5 -0.27<r<-0.1 3.39 0.00 
7 50 150 or 0 0.3 45 -0.1<r<0.04 5.08 0.76 
8 50 150 or 0 0.35 52.5 0.04<r<0.16 14.41 13.64 
9 50 150 or 0 0.4 60 0.16<r<0.27 22.03 16.67 
10 50 150 or 0 0.45 67.5 0.27<r<0.36 29.66 36.36 
11 50 150 or 0 0.5 75 0.36<r<0.45 62.71 69.70 
12 50 150 or 0 0.55 82.5 0.45<r<0.53 72.03 83.33 
13 50 150 or 0 0.6 90 0.53<r<0.6 82.20 88.64 
14 50 150 or 0 0.65 97.5 0.6<r<0.66 90.68 95.45 
15 50 150 or 0 0.7 105 0.66<r 94.92 97.73 
    Percentage of monotonic decision makers 87.41 97.81 
 
Notes: Everyone should choose option A in decision 1. Risk neutral subjects would switch to option B in 
decision 8 (italics). A switch in later decisions reveals risk aversion and a switch in earlier decisions reveals risk 
seeking behavior. Number of observations: 118 in individual choices and 132 in group choices (non-monotonic 














 Table A4: Summary of descriptive statistics 
  5-value (easy task) 100-value (difficult task) 













       
(Near) Optimal  
 
   
  control 35.6% 30.6% 30.6% 15.6% 22.2% 22.2% 
main 1-6 42.2% 47.5% 43.3% 23.3% 6.7% 11.1% 
main 7-12 35.6% 51.7% 48.6% 22.2% 13.3% 12.8% 
main 13-20 35.4% 51.9% 52.3% 22.5% 17.5% 19.6% 
  
 
     
Winner’s Curse  
 
     
control 20.0% 18.3% 18.3% 70.0% 64.4% 64.4% 
main 1-6 18.3% 9.2% 11.4% 65.6% 75.0% 72.8% 
main 7-12 17.2% 9.2% 10.6% 62.2% 61.7% 60.6% 
main 13-20 19.2% 10.6% 9.8% 68.3% 48.8% 49.6% 
 
Table A5: Within-treatment comparison: Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two-sided p-values 
5-value (easy task) 
 
100-value (difficult task) 
 
 
compare control vs. main (1-6) 
  (near) optimal  winner's curse   (near) optimal  winner's curse 
individual bid 0.1119 0.4453 individual bid 0.0087 0.2245 
n=30     n=15     
            
group bid 0.108 0.0346 group bid 0.0395 0.4443 
n=20     n=10     
compare main (1-6) vs. main (13-20) 
  (near) optimal  winner's curse   (near) optimal  winner's curse 
individual bid 0.2121 1.000 individual bid 0.6474 0.8414 
n=30     n=15     
            
group bid 0.3761 0.9323 group bid 0.0842 0.0107 
n=20     n=10     
compare control (1-6) vs. main (13-20) 
  (near) optimal  winner's curse   (near) optimal  winner's curse 
individual bid 0.9917 0.3392 individual bid 0.2335 0.4545 
n=30     n=15     
            
group bid 0.0380 0.0261 group bid 0.2591 0.2023 
n=20     n=10     
 
 
Table A6: Fisher exact tests comparing the percentages of improved and worsen groups across treatments 
 5-value     
 
Improved  Worsen + Constant Total   Improved  Worsen+ Constant Total 
Individual Treatment 12 18 30   7 8 15 
Group Treatment 14 6 20   6 4 10 
Fisher Exact Test (two-sided) p=0.048   p=0.668 
 
Table A7: Between treatment comparison: Robust rank order tests, one-tailed asymptotic p-value 
Changes from 














Individual Treatment 1.9 -1.9 
 
7.1 -4.3 
Group Treatment 19.9 -8.5 
 
-9.2 -3.9 
Robust rank order tests p=0.057 p=0.057 
 
p=0.006 p=0.244 
 
 
